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The current financial crisis has contributed to an interest in the issue of the financial 
liberalization of China. According to one view, the financial underdevelopment of China is 
one factor behind the present global imbalances.
2 These, in turn, have fuelled the ongoing 
global financial turmoil. Thus, once China gets a modern and open financial system, global 
imbalances will be reduced. Consequently, part of the solution to the present crisis may be 
found in the financial deregulation and opening of China. 
 
China is in fact already involved in a process of financial liberalization as part of the opening 
of the Chinese economy towards the rest of the world. However, the experience of financial 
deregulation in many countries suggests that the road towards financial globalization can be a 
risky, indeed a dangerous one. True, there are substantial long-run benefits from a market-
based and globally integrated financial system, but there are also potentially extremely high 
short-run costs, both economic and political, associated with the transition from a financially 
underdeveloped and closed economy to a financially open, “globalized” economy. These 
short-run costs of adjustment should also be compared to the costs of maintaining a 
financially repressed system – a comparison that is easily forgotten. The status quo is a costly 
option too. 
 
History suggests that a retreat into financial autarchy in the future cannot be ruled out.
3 A 
deep depression, war, civil unrest, and/or economic nationalism may arrest the process of 
financial globalization. However, we are of the opinion that the world economy will remain 
                                                 
1 We are indebted to Moreno Bertoldi, Nigel Chalk, Emil Ems, Hans Genberg, Ulrich Jochheim, Göran Lind and 
seminar participants at HKIMR for comments. Kenneth Chow at HKIMR and Eulalia Claros Gimeno at DG 
ECFIN have helped us with data collection. We have benefitted from excellent editorial comments by Douglas 
Jenks. 
2 See among others Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008), Blanchard, Giavazza and Sa (2005) and Cooper 
(2008). Ju and Wei (2007) provide a model on how an inefficient domestic financial system combined with weak 
corporate governance and a system of weak property rights can result in a bypass effect of simultaneous FDI 
inflows and financial capital outflows, a feature shared by many developing countries including China today.  
3 See, for example, James (2001) on the global experience of the 1930s. For a current appraisal, see Kose et al 
(2006).  
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financially open, in spite of signs pointing the opposite way during the present global 
financial crisis, and that China will continue to move towards a financially more open system 
in the foreseeable future. 
 
Thus, China may benefit from the experience - or more precisely from the policy lessons - of 
other countries, after taking due account of relevant differences in time, institutional structure 
country characteristics. The challenge is to identify the relevant lessons for China from 
countries that have undergone financial liberalization. 
 
The aim of this report is to identify a set of policy lessons that are deemed to be relevant for 
China today from the experience of financial deregulation, and the ensuing financial crisis and 
recovery in Scandinavia during the period 1985-2000.  
 
The Scandinavian countries or the Nordics – that is Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden – 
may not be the first case of financial liberalization and financial crisis that spring to the minds 
of policy-makers when they are searching for lessons that are relevant for China at the present 
time. The Nordics are small, advanced market economies and welfare states, with a history of 
stable political and legal institutions, and with well-developed commercial banking systems 
that have their roots in the 19
th century – open societies with some of the highest standards of 
living in the world today.  
 
Can these countries really hold lessons for China, one of the biggest countries in the world, 
far less developed, without a modern social security system, lacking a firm legal infrastructure, 
with large state-owned banks, and a dormant financial system: in short,– a country in 
transition from a socialist mode to a market economy?  
 
In answer to that question we are inclined to give a firm "yes". The Nordic experience is 
worth citing for many reasons. First, China today and the Nordic countries before 
liberalization share a critical mass of common features: a bank-dominated financial system, 
strong credit controls, exchange (capital account) controls, lack of risk management 
experience and lack of financial knowledge, but open on the current account side. Moreover, 
three of the four Nordic countries - Finland, Norway and Sweden - were pioneers in financial 
liberalization in the sense that they engineered sharp boom-bust developments in the late 
1980s and early 1990s as a result of a process of financial liberalization that started in the 
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mid-1980s, well before the emerging market crises of the late 1990s. The forces of financial 
deregulation and crisis were clearly exposed by the "big-bang" approach adopted by Finland 




The experience of one of the members of the Nordic quartet, Denmark, illustrates how 
financial liberalization can be implemented without any major output cost, in sharp contrast to 
events in Finland, Norway and Sweden. The tradition of openness, transparency and frank 
public debate in the Nordic countries gives us plenty of data and evidence concerning the 
process of financial liberalization. In addition, the Nordic countries managed to preserve 
consensus around the policies adopted to handle the financial crisis, as well as consensus 
around an open financial system after the financial crisis. As Chinese policy-makers are 
concerned with keeping social tensions at a minimum, the Nordic record may be of special 
interest on this front.  
 
The report is organized in the following way. Section 1 gives an overview of the present 
financial system in China, focusing on the financial underdevelopment of China and its 
implications for global imbalances. Given the state of China's financial sector, section 2 
describes the objectives and risks of financial liberalization in China. Section 3 gives an 
account of financial liberalization in Scandinavia, first by examining the factors that drove the 
boom, the bust and the recovery and, secondly, by considering the long-run post-crisis effects 
of financial opening. In section 4, the case for lesson-drawing is made, looking in more detail 
at the differences and similarities between the Nordics and China. In section 5, lessons from 








                                                 
4 By now there is a considerable literature on lessons from financial crises; many of them dealing with the record 
of China’s closest neighbours during the Asian crises in 1997-98. To our knowledge, there is no study of the 
lessons for China from the process of financial liberalization in the Nordic countries. 
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1. China's financial system. An overview 
 
1.1 The domestic dimension 
 
Table 1 provides a condensed summary of the key characteristics of the Chinese financial 
system, such as its market structure and legal and institutional framework. The system 
remains dominated by a large banking system mostly consisting of state-owned institutions. 
As of end 2007, bank loans accounted for roughly three quarters of all sources of finance, 
followed by government bonds (10 percent), corporate bonds (8 percent) and equity 
(7percent). With a domestic credit-to-GDP ratio exceeding 120 percent at end 2007, China’s 
banking system is one of the largest in the world, following decades of relatively steady and 
rapid growth (Figure 1).  
 
The four large state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) - the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB) and Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) - dominate China’s banking system, accounting for 
roughly two thirds of all banking system assets, and employing over 1.5 million staff in 
around 100,000 branches.  
 
Other institutions have a more diverse ownership structure, although government entities in 
one form or another still play an important role. These include the joint-stock commercial 
banks (JSCBs), which tend to be part-owned by sub-national governments as well as by 
foreign and private domestic investors, rural credit cooperatives, and policy banks with a 
specific development objective. Wholly owned foreign-funded banks have more recently 
begun to enter the market with China’s opening under the WTO-rules, albeit starting from a 
very small base (see below). 
 
Given this structure, reforming the SOCBs has been at the core of China’s transition towards 
a market-based financial system. It is worth recalling that the four large SOCBs were created 
less than three decades ago with the break-up of the monobank system in 1984. Given their 
legacy, the banks have for a long time continued to focus primarily on allocating credit to 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) based on government plans rather than on commercial criteria, 
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which has in part been reinforced by the absence or weakness of creditor rights, conferring an 
advantage on borrowers with implicit or explicit state guarantees.
5 The first non-state 
commercial bank was established as recently as in 1996.  
 
As a result the system has produced a large burden of non-performing loans, which has led to 
several attempts at recapitalization and bank reform.
6 The most recent major initiative to 
enhance banking system efficiency started in late 2003 when the government announced the 
recapitalization of two major SOCBs in return for changes in the legal structure, corporate 
governance and risk management, paving the way for strategic foreign investors and eventual 
listing on the Hong Kong SAR stock exchange.
7 
 
In parallel with bank restructuring, efforts have been made to improve the legal and 
supervisory framework. In April 2003, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
was established to allow an approach more focused on supervision objectives and ongoing 
banking system reform, while the People's Bank of China (PBOC) - hitherto the supervisor – 
was to further develop monetary policy, including by placing increased reliance on market-
oriented instruments.
8 In addition, the authorities gradually introduced a bank solvency 
framework based on BIS standards, as well as an international best practice in accounting and 
classification standards. A gradual widening or removal of floors and ceilings for interest 
rates since 1996 has fostered greater commercial orientation among banks.  
 
Beyond the banking system, the launch of a short-term bond market and a non-tradable share 
reform in 2005 were key developments in promoting more balanced growth of the financial 
system. These followed the creation of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
and the opening of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 1990. Yet, notwithstanding 
the stock market boom in 2007, China’s broader financial system remains underdeveloped, 
lacking adequate institutional structures such as rating agencies, accounting and audit bodies, 
and the information and legal systems which are necessary to ensure a high degree of 
transparency and disclosure standards.
9 
 
                                                 
5 A bankruptcy law was first adopted in 1998. 
6 Hope and Hu (2007) provide a detailed chronology of China’s banking reform. 
7 See Podpiera (2006) for details. 
8 See Barnett (2004). 
9 Hope and Hu (2007). 
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1.2 The external dimension 
 
The large size and steady growth of China’s banking system in part reflects a combination of 
high household savings rates, which in itself is likely to be the result of an underdeveloped 
and unbalanced financial system, and capital account restrictions that limit cross-border flows 
of capital, and reduce foreign competition and overseas investment opportunities. While bank 
deposits remain the main savings vehicle within China, access to foreign instruments is 
limited through the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor scheme (QDII). However, 
despite its recent expansion to include equities, the QDII scheme continues to play a fairly 
limited role, with only half of the approved total of US$64 billion invested – equivalent to 
about 1 percent of savings deposits.
10 In addition, a tightly managed exchange rate has 




Against this background, opening commitments under the WTO entry in 2006 and the 
approval of strategic direct investments in SOCBs by foreign banks have been the main 
external avenues of promoting financial sector reform in recent years. By now, except for the 
ABC, all large SOCBs have major foreign financial institutions as investors after successfully 
completing initial public offerings, some of which were among the largest in global banking 
history.
12 The objective of these partnerships is to enhance the efficiency of the banking 
system at large by enabling knowledge transfer, greater financial innovation and stronger 
corporate governance, including risk control, into key institutions.  
 
Foreign banks are also directly increasing their branch network, albeit from a small base. For 
instance, under the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Hong Kong SAR, 
aggregate exposure of Hong Kong SAR banks to non-bank Mainland entities increased to 
HK$891 billion (US$110 billion) in the year ending March 2008.  
                                                 
10 Until October 2007 investment from QDII funds was limited to fixed-income instruments, resulting in little 
public interest given interest differentials in favour of the Mainland and renminbi appreciation expectations. 
Sharply negative returns since then, reflecting the stock market decline, are widely considered the major reason 
why the uptake of QDII quotas has been sluggish. 
11  Until July 25, 2005, the renminbi was pegged to the U.S. dollar. Currently the exchange rate regime is 
classified as a “crawling peg”. 
12  These include for (1) ICBC: Goldman Sachs, Allianz and American Express; (2) BOC: Royal Bank of 
Scotland, UBS, and Temasek; and (3) CCB: Bank of America and Temasek. Through IPOs in Hong Kong SAR 
these three banks combined raised about US$ 41.3 billion in 2005 and 2006, respectively. For further details see 
Podpiera (2006). 
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A most striking feature of China’s integration into the global economy has been the large 
build-up in official foreign reserves during the past 15 years, rising more than tenfold from 
about US$150 billion in 1995 – at that time about the same level as for the Scandinavian 
countries combined (Figure 2). At nearly US$2 trillion, China today is by far the single 
largest holder of international reserves, owning more than the next four largest holders 
combined.
13 According to US Statistics, China accounts for about 24 percent of US Treasury 
bills and bonds held by foreigners at end 2008 (and 40 percent of the increase since 2005). 
This mainly accrues to the PBC and other government agencies tasked with the management 
of China’s official reserves. The build-up of reserves is mainly due to large and rising current 
account surpluses (reaching 11 percent of GDP in 2007), and foreign direct investment and 
other long-term capital inflows attracted by China’s rapidly growing economy. Periodically, 
there have also been inflows of hot money, fuelled by expectations of a revaluation of the 
renminbi (RMB), for example around the time of the exit from the peg to the US dollar in 
July 2005.  
 
The massive accumulation of reserves, which is unprecedented by historical and cross-
country standards, highlights China’s role in the build-up of global imbalances, whereby 
surplus countries like China are a net exporter both of goods and services and of capital to 
finance deficit countries, such as the United States. The underlying sources of the imbalances, 
in particular the question of whether and to what extent exchange rate policies have played a 
role, continue to be a controversial issue, amongst both policy-makers and researchers.
14  
 
There is a consensus that structural reforms, including bank reform and financial liberalization, 
can play an important role in affecting savings and investment behaviour and thereby help 
achieve an orderly resolution of global imbalances.
15 In addition, Chinese banks have been 
recapitalized with official reserves in past restructuring exercises, suggesting that reserves 
may also act as a buffer to cope with reform failures in the future. As such, China’s official 
                                                 
13 As of January 2009, these include: Japan (US$1 trillion); Russia (US$ 387 billion); Taiwan Province of China 
(US$ 293 billion); and India (US$ 249 billion).  
14 For an overview of approaches and a range of estimates for measuring equilibrium values of the real exchange 
rate in the case of China, see for example Li and Dunaway (2005) and Dunaway, Leigh and Li (2006). For the 
debate on the Chinese policy of reserve accumulation, see among others Bussière and Mehl (2008), Cappiello et 
al (2008), Haltmaier et al (2007) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2008). 
15 Accelerating financial sector reform has been a key policy commitment by China under the IMF multilateral 
consultation on global imbalances. For an analysis of the role of banking sector reform and financial market 
development on household consumption and firm investment in China see, for example, Aziz (2006), Aziz and 
Cui (2007), and, in particular on the interplay with enterprise reform, Dollar and Wei (2007). See also Farrell et 
al (2006). 
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reserves highlight the massive footprint that the lack of financial liberalization and of other 
structural reforms may leave on the global economy. 
 
To summarize, China’s financial system has undergone significant reform since the break-up 
of the monobank system less than three decades ago. The culture of independent and 
commercial decision-making is young at best, especially when compared with the century-old 
tradition of commercial banking in Scandinavia and other advanced market economies.  
 
At the same time, progress in overcoming a legacy of state ownership and credit allocation to 
state-owned enterprises, and in building the legal, supervisory and macroeconomic framework 
necessary for setting the appropriate risk management incentives, has been gradual. In this 
context, Ng (2007) characterized China’s transition to a market-oriented banking sector and, 
by implication, to a market-based financial system by using the famous aphorism of Deng 
Xiaoping “crossing the river by touching the stones”.  
 
Nevertheless, this gradual approach, combined with stable macroeconomic growth and capital 
controls shielding the system from foreign competition and cross-border capital flows, has 
contributed to confidence in the banking system. The steady rise of bank intermediation in 
China to some of the highest levels worldwide stands in marked contrast to the experience in 
the transition economies of Eastern and Central Europe, where periods of sharp retrenchment 
and disintermediation - in other words financial tensions and banking crises - has been a 








Financial liberalization in China has to be put in the context of overall reform towards a 
market-based economy. This implies, as shown by the experience of many transition 
economies, that reforms in the financial sector must be tackled in concert with reforms in 
                                                 
16 For an in depth review of SOCB reforms in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the CIS countries 
see for example Sherif, Borish and Gross (2003) and Tang, Zoli and Klytchnikova (2000). By contrast, some 
Asian transition economies, notably Vietnam, have maintained a path of steadily rising intermediation levels 
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other areas, notably in the corporate sector, including state-owned enterprises, in the legal and 
institutional framework, and at the macroeconomic level, including monetary and exchange 
rate policies. Given their dominance in the financial system, reforms of the large SOCBs have 
been put at the core of China’s strategy to improve the intermediation of its large private 
sector savings. However, mutually reinforcing reforms at the macroeconomic level are also on 
the agenda, such as reforms towards a more independent, market-based monetary and 
exchange rate policy, and capital account liberalization.  
 
Unlike most other transition economies, China’s experience so far has been unique in that 
domestic macroeconomic stability and growth have been maintained throughout the reform 
process. China’s economic weight in the world makes it “too big to fail”; while a large and 
growing current account surplus - or savings-investment imbalance - continues to put 
additional pressures on its major trading partners.  
 
Maintaining stability, and at the same time improving allocative efficiency through the 
liberalization process, are thus the overarching reform objectives, both from a Chinese and 
from a global perspective. Moreover, financial liberalization can also play an important role in 
rebalancing China’s growth and reducing global imbalances. As banks in China increasingly 
operate on a commercial basis, and as the capital market develops further, the efficiency of 
investments is likely to improve, while better access for households to both credit and savings 




The Chinese authorities have sought stability in the reform process primarily by adopting a 
gradual approach. Yet, while this has been reasonably successful so far, gradualism is not 
without risks. Along with the gradual reforms, there has been a build-up in domestic and 
external imbalances that result from the still artificially low cost of capital - favoured by a 
lack of competition for funds among the dominant SOCBs - of energy and land, and from 
policies that favor the export sector. At the same time, a rigid exchange-rate regime has 
hampered the effectiveness of monetary policy in curbing investment and credit growth. On 
the external front, pressures are mounting too, as China’s growing current account surplus has 
                                                                                                                                                         
comparable to that of China, Unteroberdoerster (2004). 
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become so large relative to the rest of the world that it is increasing the risk of a protectionist 
backlash, and thereby threatening global trade and investment.  
 
Moving on to the core of the financial reforms, another risk is that the gradual approach to the 
reform of SOCBs is not effective in changing their behaviour. So far, the SOCBs have 
strengthened their balance sheets with the help of public recapitalization funds, but without 
prior demonstration of improvements in key operational areas, particularly risk management. 
Non-performing loans have been successfully reduced, but this is merely a backward looking 
indicator. What would happen to non-performing loans if the economy were to slow after 
years of very rapid growth, or if the export sector were to falter - as is currently the case? 
Indeed, Podpiera (2006) demonstrates that lending behaviour of SOCBs has changed little at 
best, and in particular that the pricing of credit risks remains undifferentiated, while lending 
appears to be mainly driven by the availability of funds (i.e. savings deposits) and does not 
take enterprise performance into account.
17 
 
Given the need for a comprehensive approach to reform, there is also the risk of 
inconsistencies between reform areas. For example, without further reform of state-owned 
enterprises and the corporate sector at large, more accountable risk managers at banks may 
actually shift lending away from the private sector, given the lack of guarantees and reliable 
accounting data.  
 
Greater autonomy of banks in relation to price credit risks will require additional interest rate 
liberalization. Incentives for developing exchange risk tools will depend on the degree of 
exchange rate liberalization. In turn, the awareness of exchange rate risks and experience in 
managing them will influence the costs and benefits from further capital account liberalization. 
In this context, Prasad et al. (2005) argue that the liberalization of capital flows should be 
sequenced in a manner that reinforces domestic financial liberalization and allows for learning 
to manage additional risks, making greater exchange rate flexibility a pre-requisite for fully 




                                                 
17 As the data cover the period 1997-2004, it may be difficult to find clear evidence of changed behaviour in the 
early stages of the reforms. 
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2.3 Towards a new balance? 
 
Further financial reform and liberalization strike us as inevitable, as China’s transition to a 
market-based economy is far from completed. Yet, given the complexity of the challenge 
arising from the intricate interdependencies with progress in other reform areas and the need 
for maintaining stability, the ongoing reforms have to strike an appropriate balance between 
being gradual and being substantive. This will afford policy-makers time to learn and a 
margin of (inevitable) error, as any reform - even in advanced economies - is fraught with 
unintended consequences, which is - as we shall see - a key lesson from the Scandinavian 
liberalization experience. It will also enable the reforms in different areas to become mutually 
reinforcing and to sustain the momentum of reform. 
 
 
3. Financial liberalization, crisis and recovery in Scandinavia
18 
 
3.1 The financial system and economic policies prior to financial liberalization 
 
The policy framework and the macroeconomic policies that evolved in Finland, Norway and 
Sweden after World War II crucially influenced developments during and after financial 
liberalization. The financial system of Finland, Norway and Sweden in 1985, roughly at the 
start of the process of financial liberalization, is presented in stylized form in Table 1. The 
financial system was bank-based, with banks - both commercial and savings banks - having 
the major role as financial intermediaries. The government held a strong position in the 
governance of the financial system, determining via the central bank the allocation of credit 
and the level of interest rates. 
 
Finland, Norway and Sweden became early members of the Bretton Woods system, pegging 
their exchange rates to the US dollar. All three countries maintained far-reaching capital 
account or exchange controls. The control of the external flow of capital was a major pillar for 
post-war stabilization policies, since it isolated Finland, Norway and Sweden from 
international financial developments, thus allowing far-reaching domestic interventionist and 
selective monetary and fiscal policies. The capital account controls served as the wall behind 
                                                 
18 This section on the Scandinavian or Nordic record rests primarily on Englund and Vihriälä (2009), Jonung, 
Kiander and Vartia (2009), Steigum (2009) and Vastrup (2009). 
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which the central banks determined the rate of interest as well as the distribution and size of 
capital flows within the domestic economies according to political priorities.  
 
Monetary policy was used to subsidize those sectors of the economy that the government 
wanted to support with low interest rates and an ample supply of credit. Banking became an 
almost risk-free enterprise in this system. Since nominal interest rates were kept below 
market-clearing levels by means of regulations, the demand for credit remained greater than 
the available supply, which was rationed by the monetary authorities. As a result, households 
and firms in the private sector remained permanently credit constrained, with the exception of 
those sectors that obtained finance through credit allocation by the central bank. 
 
International financial integration contributed to the downfall of the Bretton Woods system in 
the early 1970s. Nevertheless, after its demise, both capital account controls and internal 
financial controls remained in force in Finland, Norway and Sweden, while their exchange 
rates remained pegged.  
 
In the 1970s, full employment emerged as a major policy goal. One reason was the strong 
political position of labour parties and labour unions; another reason was the dominance of 
Keynesian policy thinking. The goal of full employment in the face of the two oil crises 
(OPEC I and II) contributed to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in the form of 
several devaluations of the pegged exchange rates to maintain aggregate demand. The 
devaluations created the adjustment of real wages that was required in order to maintain full 
employment during the 1970s and early 1980s. Sweden took a leading role. When Sweden 
devalued, its Nordic neighbours commonly felt forced to follow suit in order to stay 
competitive.  
 
Denmark, however, did not follow Sweden's huge devaluation in October 1982. Instead, it 
kept its exchange rate unchanged as part of a hard currency policy that has remained in force 
since that time. In fact, the Danish decision not to follow the Swedish devaluation was a 
crucial one, as it set Denmark off on a trajectory that was different from that of Finland, 
Norway and Sweden later in the 1990s.
19 Norway did not devalue at this time either.  
 
                                                 
19 See Schaumann (1993).  
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As a result of the policy of accommodation, high inflation and high inflationary expectations 
became deeply rooted in the 1970s and early 1980s. Real after-tax interest rates turned 
negative due to the combination of regulation of nominal interest rates, high inflation and a 
tax system that allowed substantial tax deductions for private individuals for the payment of 
interest rates on housing loans.  
 
To sum up, prior to the financial crisis of the 1990s, Finland, Norway and Sweden were seen 
as small, rich, welfare states, immune to the high unemployment that plagued large parts of 
Western Europe. To many, they appeared to be successful models for economic policy based 
on consensus within society. Few understood that the macroeconomic policy regimes of the 
three countries rested on a system of far-reaching capital account regulations which isolated 
them from the rest of the world. 
 
3.2 Financial liberalization and boom-bust in Finland, Norway and Sweden 
 
Financial liberalization and the boom. In the early 1980s, the financial systems of Finland, 
Norway and Sweden underwent major deregulation, starting with Norway. The abolition of 
domestic and external controls was a gradual process, which took place over several years. It 
is difficult to identify one single comprehensive measure or indicator of the liberalization 




Financial liberalization had a fundamental effect on the incentives of lenders and borrowers. 
Bank lending could now be expanded free of any binding regulatory restrictions. Banks 
entered into fierce competition for market shares. They did so primarily by expanding loans to 
old and new customers rather than by reducing spreads between lending rates and deposit 
rates (Figure 9). However, on a risk-adjusted basis, the aggressive growth into new market 
segments may well have entailed a substantial narrowing of the banks’ interest rate margins. 
The lending boom that started in the mid-1980s channelled credit to the asset markets, 
causing rising asset prices. Asset prices grew more rapidly than consumer prices. Rising asset 
prices in turn formed the basis for rising collateral values, further fuelling credit expansion as 
part of a cumulative process. 
                                                 
20 See Figure 3 in Jonung (2008).  
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The private sector, previously strongly rationed in the credit market, made use of the growth 
in asset prices as collateral for absorbing more debt. As banks and other financial institutions 
increased their lending, in particular for property purchases, the volume of bank loans as a 
percentage of GDP rose markedly in the Nordic countries (Figure 3).  
 
In this process, the rate of inflation and inflation expectations increased further. Real after-tax 
interest rates (adjusted for inflation expectations) were negative or close to zero for companies 
and households, which bolstered their demand for loans (Figure 4). The financial system 
experienced a period of extreme expansion. The result of the new incentive structure was a 
build-up, as became apparent later, of massive over-indebtedness and corresponding over-
lending within the financial system in the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish economies.  
 
The macroeconomic outcome was a strong boom, first in Norway, and later in Finland and 
Sweden in 1988-89, as Norway had started its financial deregulation a few years before 
Finland and Sweden. The boom was characterized by overfull employment, rising 
consumption and falling savings. The current account worsened as export performance 
weakened, sharply in Norway - primarily as a result of falling oil prices around 1986 - and 
more slowly in Finland and Sweden. The national budgets turned into surplus during the peak 
on the back of property- and capital-based taxes, as well as tax revenues related to booming 
consumption and high nominal wage growth. Public consumption and public expenditures 
also grew rapidly during the boom. Strong international expansion in the second half of the 
1980s compounded the overheating of the Nordic economies, in particular in Finland and 
Sweden. 
 
At this point in time, judging from policy documents, from interviews after the crisis with 
policy-makers and from the memoirs of ministers of finance and central bankers, the policy-
makers did not recognise the risks inherent in the process of financial integration. Initially 
they were unwilling to change either monetary or fiscal policy. Monetary policy was confined 
to safeguarding the pegged exchange rate, with the exception of the devaluation of the 
Norwegian currency in 1986 following the decline in the price of oil (OPEC III). Finland 
made a failed attempt to dampen its boom in 1989 by revaluing the markka.  
 
All in all, financial deregulation was the key to the birth of the strong boom phase in all three 
countries. The deregulation was pushed through without any serious public debate. It was not 
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presented as part of a larger policy programme, but rather as a series of technical changes. 
There was no common knowledge of the consequences of international financial integration, 
although a few voices did warn of the dangers.
21  
 
Rising real interest rates and bust. The boom in the real economy was eventually halted and 
transformed into a bust by a combination of factors. Real interest rates rose internationally as 
a result of German monetary policy becoming more contractionary after German reunification, 
putting strong upward pressure on Nordic interest rates. In addition, monetary policy was 
made more restrictive by the pegging of the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish currencies to 
the ecu in 1990-91. Previously, the exchange rates had been linked to a basket of currencies. 
Finnish and Swedish domestic interest rates rose strongly above those of Germany when 
attempts were made to defend the pegged exchange rate against recurring speculative attacks 
in 1989-92.
22 As the Finnish and Swedish currencies became overvalued because of the boom, 
the export sector encountered growing problems. For Finland, the collapse of trade with the 
Soviet Union contributed to domestic imbalances.  
 
Various policy measures increased the real after-tax interest rate. In Finland, stepwise 
limitations in the tax deductibility of mortgage rates in the early 1990s raised the after-tax 
cost of servicing debt. The far-reaching Swedish tax reform of 1990-91, which lowered 
marginal taxes significantly, contributed to higher real after-tax interest rates by reducing the 
tax deductibility of mortgage rates. In this way, borrowing became less attractive, while 
private savings grew more attractive. A rapid and not altogether expected decline in the rate 
of consumer price inflation in 1990-92 also contributed to the sharp rise in real interest rates 
in Finland and Sweden (Figure 4).  
 
The big increase in the real rate of interest had profound effects on the balance sheets of the 
private sector. Asset price deflation surfaced when the value of real assets was reduced by the 
rise in real interest rates. Balance sheets turned fragile when asset values - primarily property 
prices - fell below collateral values. At the same time, the nominal values of debts remained 
unchanged. The losses of wealth became enormous, forcing an adjustment of portfolios which 
                                                 
21 On this point see Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2009) for the record of Finland and Sweden and Steigum (2009) 
for the case of Norway. 
22 See Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2009).  
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The harder households and companies tried to improve their wealth position by selling assets, 
the deeper the crisis became. The number of bankruptcies increased dramatically. Asset price 
deflation showed a cumulative tendency. The selling off of property forced down property 
prices which, in turn, triggered new sales. Stock market prices tumbled, in particular those of 
firms engaged in the financial sector, real estate and construction. The crisis turned into a 




Investments plummeted, most rapidly within the construction sector. Real GDP growth fell 
sharply. The Finnish and Swedish economies contracted in the early 1990s (Figure 5). 
Unemployment soared. Tax revenues fell and public expenditure rose. In Finland and Sweden, 
the government budget deficit - and thus the ratio of government debt to GDP - increased 
dramatically, particularly in Finland. Norway, on the other hand, did not experience any rise 
in government debt thanks to large government revenues from oil and gas extraction.  
 
In 1992, the financial system of all the three countries was rocked when their currencies were 
exposed to major speculative attacks. An international currency crisis erupted in September 
1992. The domestic banking crisis quickly turned into a currency crisis as well. The Finnish 
markka was floated in September 1992. The Swedish krona followed suit two months later, in 
November 1992. The Norwegian krone was taken off its pegged rate in December 1992. 
 
Recovery. The floating of the currencies in the autumn of 1992, with ensuing depreciation and 
receding domestic interest rates, arrested the downturn of the Finnish, Norwegian and 
Swedish economies. An upturn commenced in all three countries in the following year and 
lasted for several years, although unemployment remained high for a long time. 
Unemployment did not start to decline until the mid-1990s, from which point it fell steadily. 
The main engine behind the recovery was an impressive growth in exports. Export shares rose 
significantly in all three countries, most markedly in Finland and Sweden. 
                                                 
23 See Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2009) for the balance sheet adjustment in Finland and Sweden and Steigum 
(2009) in Norway.  
24 For a summary of the balance sheet approach to financial crisis, see Allen et al (2002).  
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The rate of inflation stayed contained, at around two percent per annum throughout the period 
1995-2000. Wage and price increases remained at surprisingly low levels given the size of the 
depreciation of the currencies. High unemployment contributed to low wage increases. Fiscal 
policy was directed towards lowering the budget deficits. The three countries eventually 
emerged among the strongest in Europe in terms of their budgetary position, although the 
Norwegian case is a special one due to its revenues from the energy sector.  
 
The recovery after the boom-bust cycle turned out to be a lengthy one - it lasted at least until 
the downturn in worldwide economic activity around 2001. Finnish and Swedish growth rates 
in the early 2000s remained above the EU average however. 
 
3.3 The exception - the case of Denmark 
 
Denmark avoided the economy-wide systemic financial crisis that hit Finland, Norway and 
Sweden in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A combination of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic factors contributed to Denmark being spared the Nordic boom-bust pattern, 




In the early 1980s, Denmark was facing severe economic problems. Unemployment, inflation 
and interest rates were high; large budget deficits prevailed and deficits on the current account 
were large. In addition, policy-makers faced a credibility problem as the Danish krone had 
been devalued several times. In the midst of these problems, on 9 September 1982, Denmark 
announced the adoption of a hard currency policy by tying the krone to the ecu, a basket of 
European currencies. A month later, when Sweden devalued by 16 percent on October 8, 
Denmark decided not to follow suit, instead remaining in the European Monetary System 
(EMS) of pegged exchange rates where the German mark acted as the anchor of the system. 
Thus, Danish monetary policy was tied to Germany's policy.  
 
The credibility of the Danish currency peg gradually increased: Fiscal policy was tightened in 
the face of chronic and rising current account deficits. By 1990, this policy gradually wiped 
out the deficit, turning it into a surplus of 3 percent of GDP in 1993, while Finland and 
                                                 
25 This section is based on Vastrup (2009). See also Callesen et al (2008), Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998) and 
Schaumann (1993). 
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Sweden displayed huge deficits in 1990-93. Following gradual reforms of the labour market 
and cautious demand management in the second half of the 1990s, unemployment fell to a 
level below that of most other European countries. 
 
As a result, the European currency crises in 1992-93 and the short-term deviation by Denmark 
from the pegged exchange rate regime during this episode did not affect the stability of either 
the Danish economy or its banking sector. In the long-term perspective, the external 
orientation of fiscal policy and the strict adherence to a pegged exchange rate for the krone 
were crucial in bringing about macroeconomic stability in Denmark after the precarious 
situation in the early 1980s. In contrast to its Nordic neighbours, Denmark managed to create 
a macroeconomic policy that did not foster a boom-bust cycle, thereby contributing to stable 
financial and monetary conditions.  
 
Turning to the financial sector, Denmark adopted a more market-oriented approach to the 
governance of financial markets in the post-World War II period than its Nordic neighbours. 
Denmark also entered a process of financial liberalization in the 1980s. However, it started 
from a position where - as early as the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s - Danish financial markets 
were already more integrated with the international financial markets than was the case in the 
other Nordic countries. Quantitative and other restrictions on the banking sector (internal 
liberalization) had already been terminated in 1980-81, prior to domestic deregulation in 
Finland, Norway and Sweden. Moreover, deregulation was introduced in the midst of a 
recession. All in all, financial liberalization in Denmark involved less of a change in 
prevailing conditions than was the case in the other Nordic countries.  
 
The financial position of commercial banks in Denmark deteriorated in the late 1980s. The 
problems came to a head in 1991-93, when the total losses and loss provisions reached more 
than 5 percent of GDP. The losses and loss provisions relative to GDP of Danish banks were 
at the same level as in Norway, although lower than in Finland and Sweden. However, the 
problems of Danish banks never developed into a systemic banking crisis.
26 Government 
support for commercial banks in Denmark stayed at 0.4 percent of GDP, whereas it was 8.1 
percent for Finland, 3.6 percent for Norway and 4.1 percent for Sweden. In addition, the 
                                                 
26 This is also seen from the banking crisis database compiled by Caprio et al (2005), covering banking crisis 
since the late 1970s. This database ranks the banking crises of Finland, Norway and Sweden as systemic crises 
while the Danish banking record is not classified as a systemic crisis. 
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Danish banking system was able to absorb the losses and the loss provisions by itself because 
Danish banks were better capitalized than the banks of the other Nordic countries.
27 
 
To sum up, a combination of macroeconomic and structural policies inoculated the Danish 
economy against the forces that created the boom-bust patterns in Finland, Norway and 
Sweden in the late 1980s. Denmark adopted a hard currency policy in the early 1980s and 
managed to maintain this approach despite a number of challenges, including problems within 
its banking system. That system was well-capitalized and more geared towards financial 
openness than was the case in the other Nordic countries.  
 
3.4 The long-run effects of financial integration 
 
The Nordic financial crisis of the 1990s was a devastating one, as demonstrated in Table 2 
which shows the real costs of the major crises that have hit the Nordic economies since the 
1870s, using an approach developed by the IMF (in 1998) and extended by Bordo et al. 
(2001). The loss in real income growth, as defined by the IMF approach, is calculated by 
taking the sum of the differences between the trend growth rate and the actual growth rate 
from the start of the crisis until the growth rate returns to trend rate. This is also done for 
industrial production.  
 
Table 2 shows that the financial crisis of the 1990s, measured as the output loss in percent of 
GDP, was deepest in Finland (26.4 percent), followed by Sweden (13.0 percent) and Norway 
(12.4 percent); Denmark did not experience any crisis in the 1990s.  
 
The same picture emerges when the cost of the crises is estimated in terms of loss of industrial 
production, although there are two main differences. The crises in Finland and Sweden are 
close in terms of size (21.4 and 17.0 percent, respectively), while the cost of the crisis in 
Norway is very small (2.7 percent). As mentioned above, there is no evidence of any crisis in 
Denmark in the 1990s. Table 2 also shows that the crisis in Norway started earlier than in 
Finland and Sweden, but did not last as long. The annual loss in Norway is considerably 
smaller than in Finland and Sweden.
28  
                                                 
27 See Vastrup (2009). 
28 The cost of the crises of the 1990s in Finland, Norway and Sweden has been calculated in alternative ways by 
Schwierz (2004, Table 4). He demonstrates that the result is sensitive to the exact method applied and to the 
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Looking beyond the immediate crisis and its costs to society, it is clear that financial 
liberalization has profoundly changed the economic landscape in the Nordic countries. These 
long-run effects have been overshadowed by the dramatic events during the boom-bust cycle. 
However, once financial markets were opened up, this impacted on a large number of sectors 
both inside and outside the financial system. 
 
The rules for monetary and fiscal policy-making were reformed. Inflation targets were 
introduced. Finland entered the euro area in 1999 as part of the process of European monetary 
and financial integration. The stock markets of Finland and Sweden expanded as part of the 
process of financial opening and integration. Foreign holdings of domestic stocks showed a 
rapid rise. Corporate governance changed profoundly once foreign ownership was allowed. 
Taxation was adjusted to international tax competition. These effects are discussed below.
29  
 
Effects on the design of stabilization policies. Financial liberalization had a major impact on 
the stabilization policy regime in Finland, Norway and Sweden. First, the pegged exchange 
rate regime of the three countries was abolished, as the pegged rate proved to be an 
inadequate nominal anchor during the process of financial liberalization and the ensuing 
boom-bust. After the crisis, the pegged rate was replaced by inflation targeting. This monetary 
policy strategy, founded on openness, accountability and communication through changes in 
the short-term interest rate set by the central bank, requires the existence of well-functioning 
financial markets. Thus, financial liberalization and subsequent financial integration created 
the prerequisites for a new type of monetary policy regime or policy framework that could not 
have existed in the previous economy, which had been financially closed and heavily 
regulated, and where short- and long-term interest rates were subject to strict administrative 
controls.  
 
Second, following the experience of large budget deficits, the institutional framework for 
fiscal policy making was changed - particularly in Sweden - towards a rule-based policy. The 
basic idea was to reduce the scope for short-term discretionary fiscal policies by tying the 
hands of policy-makers. This policy has so far been successful in the sense that the Nordic 
countries can point to some of the strongest public finances in Europe.   
                                                                                                                                                         
dating of the start and end of the crisis. Still, the loss ranking between Finland, Norway and Sweden remains the 
same.  
29 See Jonung (2008) on the systemic effects of financial openness. 
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Effects on growth: Although improving economic efficiency is the central objective, there is 
still considerable debate about the growth effects of financial liberalization, given that it is 
often associated with boom-bust patterns, ending in financial crises and deep recessions with 
negative growth rates.
30 The evidence from Scandinavia, which is not commonly referred to 
in the international debate, 
 throws light on the relationship between financial integration and 
growth. In short, the Nordic record suggests that financial crises, triggered by a process of 
financial liberalization, can be extremely costly in the short run in many respects: to society, 
to taxpayers, to owners of stocks and equities, and to politicians in power. However, such 
crises can also contribute to high growth for a long period following the recovery (Table 2).  
 
The fiscal cost of the crisis was enormous, as budget deficits and public debt soared when tax 
revenues declined and government expenditures increased, largely due to the workings of 
automatic stabilizers. Government support for the financial system ballooned in the short run. 
The private sector - in particular holders of stocks in banks and other financial institutions - 
was hit by huge wealth losses. The political costs were significant too. Governments in power 
at the start of the crisis lost popularity and were replaced in subsequent elections. Whether or 
not the policy-makers in power were the ones who had designed the policies that led to the 
crisis, the voters held them responsible. 
 
Looking at the long-run consequences of the financial crisis on the growth of the economy 
during the early 1990s, a more positive picture emerges. The post-crisis growth rates of 
Finland and Sweden have been high compared to the EU average since 1993 and also 
compared to the pre-crisis growth pattern of the 1970s and 1980s. There is much to suggest 




The financial crisis served as a window of opportunity for policy-makers to carry out growth-
enhancing reforms. In this way, the crisis contributed to the transformation of the Nordic 
economies, making them more dynamic, releasing Schumpeterian processes and raising their 
                                                 
30 See Henry (2007) and Tornell and Westermann (2005) for recent surveys of the issues involved. Their work 
deals with middle-income or emerging-market economies, while the Nordic countries are high income 
economies.  
31 See the evidence discussed in Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2009). 
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growth potential. It is likely that the rapid developments in the financial systems of Finland 
and Sweden impacted positively on the growth potential of the two economies.  
 
Effects on structural policies: Most of the discussion of the immediate impact of financial 
liberalization and financial integration has focused on the banking system and the financial 
sector. However, once the cross-border barriers to financial flows had been eliminated in 
Finland and Sweden, competitive pressure for efficiency-enhancing reform spilled over into 
areas other than the financial system.  
 
This affected policy areas such as the rules and regulations dealing with foreign ownership of 
domestic real and financial assets, the taxation of income and wealth in a financially open 
economy and the design of corporate governance laws.
32 In Sweden, gift taxes, inheritance 
taxes and wealth taxes were abolished in the early 2000s in response to the opening of the 
Swedish financial sector. These are radical changes for a country with a strong egalitarian 
tradition. Financial integration is thus likely to impact on the distribution of income and 
wealth. Recent empirical research suggests that periods of financial integration and freely 




To sum up, financial integration following the policy of financial liberalization lent a very 
powerful impetus to the process of globalization of the Nordic economies, affecting the 
characteristics of the Nordic or Scandinavian model.
34 There is much to suggest that this 
pattern is to a large extent due to the long-run adjustment dynamics created by the financial 
crisis and by subsequent financial integration.  
 
 
4. The case for learning lessons 
 
In our introduction we asked the question: Can the Nordic experience of financial 
liberalization really hold lessons for China, given the differences between China and the 
Nordics? We believe that these differences do not preclude the drawing of lessons per se. 
                                                 
32 For example, financial liberalization impacted strongly on corporate governance in Finland and Sweden. See 
Ylä-Antilla et al (2005) on the Finnish case and Henrekson and Jakobsson (2005) on the Swedish case.  
33 Roine et al (2008). 
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Rather they indicate the extent to which policy lessons should be qualified to reflect country-
specific circumstances. Still, we will argue below that it is the similarities that dominate, as 
China and the Nordic countries share a critical mass of common features. Moreover, the 
Nordic reform experience holds lessons of a general nature on the dynamics of boom and bust 
and how to preserve a consensus for reform that are worthwhile for China to consider as it 
proceeds with financial liberalization. 
 
4.1 Differences between the Nordics and China 
 
Size is arguably the main fundamental difference between the Nordics and China. (See Table 
3 for some key demographic and economic comparisons between the Nordics and China). By 
the end of 2007, about 15 percent of the world's population lived in China, more than 70 times 
the total population of the Nordics as a whole. China’s GDP was about 11 percent of the 
world total, or about four times that of the Nordic countries. China’s size means that 
monitoring and maintaining an orderly and steady reform process is more challenging than in 
the case of the Nordics. This is further complicated by China’s significantly less advanced 
stage of development and much higher income inequality. The Nordics’ per capita income is 
about 8 times higher than that of China in purchasing power parity terms (Figure 6). In 
addition, income inequality, in particular between coastal areas and inland provinces, has been 
rising rapidly in China.
35 As a result, the risk that the social costs of reform may create social 
tensions is significantly higher in China than it was in the case of the Nordics. Indeed, a 
highly risk-averse approach and the fear of economic and social instability on the side of the 
Chinese authorities are part of the explanation why China’s process of financial liberalization 
has been more gradual than in Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
 
Risks associated with differences in size and stages of development are mitigated by China's 
more favourable macroeconomic performance in a number of areas. First of all, China’s 
economic growth in the past decade has been high and stable at an average annual rate of 
nearly 10 percent, much higher than among the Nordics where growth rates ranged between 0 
and 4 percent in the early 1980s before financial liberalization (Figure 5). Second, high 
economic growth in China in recent years has resulted in stronger government revenues and 
smaller fiscal deficits than among the Nordics. The official government debt figure is only 21 
                                                                                                                                                         
34 The Scandinavian or Nordic model is recently evaluated in Andersen et al (2007) and Calmfors (2007). 
35 Lueth and Syed (2006) provide a detailed cross-country analysis of rising inequality and polarization in Asia. 
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percent of GDP in China, although contingent liabilities might be large. In the Nordic 
countries, the budget deficits were large in the late 1970s and early 1980s due to stimulus 
spending to combat the effects of two oil crises (Figure 7). Third, as mentioned before, China 
has the largest foreign reserves in the world, close to US$2 trillion, more than 170 percent of 
total imports or nearly seven times its short-term debt, while the Nordic countries as a whole 
held less than US$30 billion of foreign reserves in 1985, i.e. 38 percent of total imports 
(Figure 2). Fourth, China’s currency, the renminbi, experienced no depreciation pressure, 
whereas the currencies in Nordic countries had been depreciating in the early 1980s.  
 
Finally, regarding the financial system, the volume of credit supplied by China’s banking 
system as a percentage of GDP is more than 100 percent, much higher than the ratio for the 
Nordic countries in early 1980s, which was less than 50 percent of GDP (Figure 1). Stock 
market capitalization as a percentage of GDP is also relatively high - even after making 
allowance for the boom in 2008 - compared with the Nordic countries in the early 1980s 
(Figure 8). Given its stage of development, China’s financial system thus enjoys a relatively 
high level of intermediation and confidence. Taken together, these strong macroeconomic 
fundamentals, compared to the case of the Nordics, provide positive initial conditions for 
China’s process of financial liberalization.  
 
In addition, China’s relative lack of financial openness, revealed in Figures 11 and 12, can - at 
least initially - help provide a controlled environment for reform by minimising the adverse 
impact of potentially volatile capital flows. The ratio of foreign assets to the total volume of 
assets of the banking system in Scandinavia is much higher than in China (Figure 11). 
Currently, Scandinavia is forging far ahead of China on this account. The same holds for the 
ratio of foreign liabilities to total liabilities (Figure 12). A similar picture emerges from 
inward foreign direct investments (Figure 13) and outward foreign direct investments (Figure 
14), where Scandinavia is more open, in particular as regards outward flows.  
 
Nevertheless, there remain major structural disadvantages relative to the Nordics. The 
Chinese economy is presently in transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-
based one. Although the process has been ongoing for 30 years, there is a large state-owned 
sector that is subject to soft budget constraints. This was not the case for the Nordics, as they 
are market economies. The banking system, the capital market and corporate governance are 
still at a relatively early stage of development in China, as highlighted in Table 1. The legal 
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system with regard to bankruptcy procedures, enforcement structure and the rights of creditors 
and debtors is far less developed than in the Nordic countries with their long legal tradition. 
 
4.2 Similarities between the Nordic countries and China 
 
Notwithstanding the above differences, there are important similarities that provide a sound 
basis for drawing lessons. First of all, China’s financial system is dominated by four large 
state-owned commercial banks, and its financial reform and liberalization is part of the overall 
reform from centrally planned economy to market-based economy, which is also in line with 
China’s WTO commitment. This is similar to the situation in the Nordic countries in the early 
1980s, where banks dominated the financial system and financial reforms were part of a 
movement towards economic liberalization, catching up with the rest of Western Europe, as 
well as a way of moving towards closer European integration.  
 
Secondly, China still has a large state-owned sector, which faces much less strict conditions 
when seeking loans from banks. Interest rates on deposits and loans are still controlled by the 
central bank, with a floor for lending rates and a ceiling for deposit rates. The lending-deposit 
rate gap is relatively large; commercial banks are under the protection of the central bank and 
interest income still dominates their revenue sources. Banking supervision is mostly 
administrative, although it has made some progress towards risk-based supervision. This is 
similar to the situation in the Nordic countries before liberalization, where interest rates were 
controlled, there was credit rationing with a large lending-deposit spread (Figure 9), real rates 
of interest were low (Figure 4), and stock and bond markets and foreign competition were 
kept at bay.  
 
As a corollary to direct financial market intervention and administrative measures, policy-
makers and regulators in China today have little experience in managing financial 
liberalization. Monetary policy is largely based on quantitative regulations. This was also the 
case for the Nordics when they started on the road to financial liberalization in the 1980s. 
 
Finally, on the external side, both China and the Nordics are open economies on the current 
account. China's current export share as a percentage of GDP is similar to that of the Nordic 
countries in the early 1980s, i.e. around 30 percent of GDP (Figure 10). From a historical 
perspective, the Nordics have benefitted from participating in the global economy, building 
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their high standard of living on international trade and openness - a strategy that is similar to 
the case of China today. China's capital account is not fully liberalized, but the same was true 
for Finland, Norway and Sweden before liberalization.  
 
4.3 The case for learning lessons for China 
 
We suggest a number of reasons to support our case for drawing lessons for China from the 
Nordic experience of financial liberalization.  
 
First of all, while the major differences between China and Scandinavia need to be borne in 
mind when lessons are being identified, the two economies share important characteristics as 
far as the state of the economy at the start of the process of financial deregulation is 
concerned: namely a bank-dominated financial system, strong credit controls, lack of risk 
management experience, lack of financial knowledge, and exchange controls, while at the 
same time being open on the current account. As a result, the incentives and processes 
unleashed by financial liberalization are likely to be similar. 
 
Second, the Nordic reform experience is easily accessible and imparts lessons of a general 
nature. The failures and mistakes that occurred during the financial liberalization in the 
Nordic countries have been openly revealed by memoirs and comments published by 
politicians and bankers involved in the process, by government reports and by academic 
studies. The message from this literature may help Chinese policy-makers understand the 
dangers of financial liberalization and thus minimize the risks of managing financial 
deregulation.  
 
Third, the history of boom-bust cycles across countries, across time and across various 
institutional frameworks suggests that financial crises possess some general characteristics. 
As long as there is a credit market, there will be a risk of boom-bust cycles. The issue for 
China is not to completely avoid boom-bust patterns –that is an impossible task – but to 
understand how boom-bust cycles interact with the financial liberalization process, how loose 
monetary policy may fuel credit booms, how to read the onset of a coming credit boom, so as 
to understand the policy actions that would minimize the cost of financial liberalization. A 
careful analysis of the record of financial deregulation and boom-bust cycles in the Nordic 
countries, as well as in other countries, can provide such lessons for China.  
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Fourth, the successful record of Denmark demonstrates that financial opening does not need 
to end in a deep crisis, as long as the right macroeconomic and regulatory policies are in place. 
The Danish exception thus holds an important lesson for China as well. 
 
Fifth, the Nordic countries maintained consensus around the policies adopted to handle the 
financial crisis, as well as consensus around an open financial system after the financial crisis. 
Thus, the crisis did not give rise to a political backlash against financial openness. Since 
Chinese policy-makers are concerned with keeping social tensions to a minimum, the Nordics' 
record may be of particular interest on this account.  
 
Sixth, the financial reforms in the Nordics was part of a movement towards economic 
liberalization, catching up with the rest of Europe, as well as a way of moving them towards 




5. Lessons for China from Scandinavia 
 
This section draws out six lessons from the Nordic experience of financial liberalization that 
we regard as being of interest for China. Of course, lesson-drawing is not an exact science. 
We do not claim to have made an unbiased selection – but merely to have focused on those 
features we believe are most relevant for China today.
36 
 
The first lesson concerns the dangers of financial ignorance. The second lesson suggests that 
reforms should be properly sequenced to minimize pro-cyclical effects. The third lesson 
covers the role of micro-prudential financial supervision during financial deregulation. From 
these insights, we derive our fourth lesson regarding the benefits of a flexible approach, 
embracing time for learning and preparedness to respond rapidly to emergencies. The fifth 
lesson stresses that financial liberalization may avoid crisis and costly losses to society – as 
long as it is designed properly. Finally, in our sixth lesson, we highlight the long-run benefits 
of financial liberalization. 
 
                                                 
36 This section is based on the lessons of Nordic financial liberalization compiled by Jonung (2008). Here the 
focus is on the experience of Finland, Norway and Sweden.  
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5.1. Lesson 1: The dangers of financial ignorance  
 
The Nordic episodes illustrate the dangers of a lack of knowledge about the processes set in 
motion by financial liberalization and financial integration. If such knowledge is not to hand, 
then the proper response before, during and after financial liberalization is not likely to be 
forthcoming. When financial deregulation began in Scandinavia, decision-makers in all 
segments of society were trapped in a pattern of thinking that made little or no allowance for 
financially driven booms, busts and crises. This was the case of policy-makers in the central 
banks and the ministries of finance, as well as of forecasters of future economic developments, 
financial regulators, the economics profession, bankers and other actors in the financial 
system, and of the public at large.  
 
The system of financial controls and regulations that had prevented the workings of financial 
markets since World War II created widespread financial ignorance or illiteracy. For this 
reason, when the process of financial liberalization started in the 1980s, the behaviour 
established during many decades of financial repression was continued without an 
understanding that the old risk-free world was rapidly being replaced by a new, and 
financially more risky world. Financial ignorance thus accounts for much of the behaviour 
that gave rise to the financial crisis. 
 
Decision-makers in charge of monetary and fiscal policies commonly viewed steps towards 
financial deregulation in the mid-1980s as technical adjustments that were of no major 
consequence for aggregate economic performance. In addition, the first impact of financial 
liberalization was a lending boom with rising consumption and wealth, which was appreciated 
by the parties in political power. Thus, no major counteracting stabilization policy measures 
were taken until it was too late. Similarly, financial regulators were unaware of the risks 
created by financial deregulation and lax monetary and fiscal policies and took no effective 
action to slow the process of credit growth.  
 
Official forecasts, made both within Scandinavia and by international organizations, failed to 
identify the boom-bust cycle. The errors in forecasts made at the end of the 1980s and at the 
beginning of the 1990s were much larger than the average errors for the post-war period. 
Forecast errors emerged during both the boom and the bust phases of the cycle. At the end of 
the 1980s, when the economy was overheated, it took longer than expected for it to cool down. 
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When the bust and downturn came, it was much deeper than expected, and once again the 
recovery from the crisis was faster than most commentators had anticipated. The systematic 
collective bias in forecast performance, reflecting the lack of knowledge by professional 
forecasters about financial events, contributed to serious policy mistakes.  
 
Economists at universities in Scandinavia were caught up in a Keynesian world of flow 
variables, being unfamiliar with the wealth, portfolio and balance sheet effects created by 
financial liberalization and changes in real interest rates. As a rule, economists were in favour 
of financial liberalization. They viewed deregulation as part of a supply-side approach aimed 
at improving growth performance, with little understanding of the imbalances and dangers 
that financial deregulation could bring about if it were not combined with proper counter-
measures such as more restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. Thus, few warnings emerged 
from the economics profession at a time when such advice would have been most appropriate.  
 
Bankers and other actors on financial markets were ignorant of the change in the rules of the 
game. They lacked an understanding of the workings of unregulated financial markets 
because they had only experienced a financially closed and strongly regulated economy, 
where financial risks were exceptionally limited. The same held for private individuals and 
firms. As soon as credit became freely available, borrowers rapidly turned to the financial 
sector to enter deep into debt. Thus, the credit boom was fuelled by lenders and borrowers 
with little understanding of the risks of unsustainable loan expansion. 
 
The policy lesson for China is simple. A thorough analytical and factual understanding of the 
consequences of a move towards financial integration, and of the workings of unfettered 
financial markets, is crucial to making financial liberalization and subsequent financial 
integration successful. Financial knowledge should be as widely disseminated as possible: 
among domestic policy-makers, regulators, official and private forecasters, economists, 
financial sector participants and, most importantly, among the public at large. When China 
deregulates its financial markets in the future, new financial risks are likely to build up 
through the emergence of new instruments and techniques that did not exist in the Nordics in 
the 1980s. Of course, these cannot be predicted today, but financial literacy, including proper 
learning from other countries, can help in the design of a balanced response to financial 
integration. The history of financial crisis suggests that particular attention should be paid to 
the growth of credit aggregates, as credit is the main driver of boom-bust cycles. Moreover, 
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relatively stable interest rate margins, as in the case of the Nordics, may have masked the 
growing risks that banks were actually taking in the competition for market shares, when they 
ventured into new markets and product segments where they had scant experience of risk 
management. 
 
5.2. Lesson 2: The importance of sequencing reforms to avoid pro-cyclicality 
 
The Nordic record of financial liberalization demonstrates that the sequencing of financial 
reforms, internally and externally, on the route to financial liberalization is of the utmost 
importance in determining macroeconomic performance. It is the key to the ruinous record of 
Finland and Sweden. To summarize, financial markets were first deregulated internally in the 
mid-1980s, which set off a sharp lending boom, fuelled by an inflow of capital, while 
outflows were prevented by capital controls. Later, at the end of the 1980s, financial markets 
were externally deregulated, allowing an outflow of capital, while the central banks chose to 
defend the pegged exchange rate with high interest rates. The pegged exchange rate was then 
abandoned when the crisis reached its peak. An earlier floating or adjustment of the peg could 
have dampened the boom-bust pattern - or even eliminated it if financial liberalization had 
simultaneously been combined with a floating rate.  
 
First of all, as discussed in Box 1, financial liberalization under given tax incentives meant 
that, for the three crisis-ridden Nordic countries, real after-tax interest rates were initially kept 
at a very low level through favourable taxation of interest payments on loans. However, 
taxation was changed in various stages in all three countries, which raised real after-tax 
interest rates significantly. Tax rules thus made a procyclical contribution, fuelling the boom 
and exacerbating the bust. In a more appropriate sequencing, taxation would have been 
reformed at a very early stage of the financial liberalization process. 
 
Second, by maintaining and defending the pegged rate of their currencies, the Nordic 
countries created a strongly procyclical monetary policy both during and after financial 
liberalization. During the boom phase, interest rates could not be raised to counter the boom, 
because that would have increased capital inflows and thus strengthened the credit boom. 
Once the cycle started to turn downwards, the pegged exchange rate had to be defended by 
raising the domestic interest rates, thus contributing to the downturn. Eventually, the defense 
of the peg made the domestic crisis so deep that the peg had to be abandoned. This happened 
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in the autumn of 1992: in September in Finland, in November in Sweden and in December in 
Norway.  
 
Thirdly, fiscal policy, i.e. the design of taxes and government expenditures, played a key role 
in the process of financial liberalization. During the boom phase, it was commonly procyclical. 
Although the fiscal authorities apparently believed that fiscal policy was contractionary 
because budget surpluses were being registered, these surpluses were too small to 
counterbalance the boom. Fiscal policy should therefore have been much tighter. During the 
bust phase, primarily due to the workings of automatic stabilizers, budget deficits expanded 
extremely rapidly. Now, the rise in deficits prompted far-reaching policy measures to reduce 
government expenditures and raise taxes in Finland and Sweden, thereby making the 
recession deeper. 
 
The policy lesson for China is that policy-makers should consider the macroeconomic or 
cyclical consequences of structural changes in regulation and taxes, of the exchange rate 
regime and of the fiscal regime. Tax reforms may be highly recommendable as part of a 
policy for improved growth and efficiency, but they may also have undesirable effects when 
interacting with other developments. Thus, policy-makers should pay careful attention to 
initial conditions when changing prevailing financial regulations and schemes of taxation. The 
same holds for the potential pro-cyclicality of the workings of the exchange rate regime. Most 
prominently, the existence of a pegged but adjustable exchange rate can easily amplify 
cyclical developments during a process of financial liberalization, thus creating a conflict 
between internal and external stability. This lesson is illustrated not only by the Nordics, but 
also by the experience of the crisis in many other countries.
37  
 
Concerning China, it may be prudent to focus reforms initially on the domestic front so as to 
strengthen the financial system before it is exposed to international competitive forces. 
Moving beyond this initial phase, the currency crises in Scandinavia show that risks arising 
from external opening can be mitigated by allowing greater exchange rate flexibility before, 
or at least in conjunction with, capital account opening. Not only can monetary policy 
effectiveness be maintained to a greater extent, but also banks have stronger incentives to 
                                                 
37 Wyplosz (2001, p. 157), summarizing the post-World War II European experience of financial repression and 
liberalization, states "The lifting of capital controls requires the end of any fixed exchange rate regime that might 
have been in place." 
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control the currency risks arising from cross-border financial flows. As a result, the 
procyclical forces inherent in providing financial institutions with a greater degree of freedom 
can be tamed. Moreover, in terms of timing, the Nordic experience shows that the capital 
account should be opened when inflow or outflow pressures arising from the position in the 
economic cycle are minimal. 
 
5.3. Lesson 3: The limits of micro-prudential financial supervision  
 
Prior to the financial deregulation in the mid 1980s, the system of financial supervision was 
well developed in Finland, Norway and Sweden, albeit with a focus on correct accounting. 
There were no weak banks, no "crony banking", no dubious links between banks and 
industrial companies, political parties or private families reflecting nepotism and corruption. 
In addition, no banks were dependent on state subsidies or state support. Still, in spite of the 
existing financial supervision, the financial crises of the early 1990s brought the entire 
banking system close to collapse, prompting major government financial intervention, forcing 
several banks into bankruptcy or into obtaining support through public funds.  
 
The policy lesson for China is that conventional micro-prudential financial supervision, 
adopted to monitor tightly regulated financial institutions, is not up to the task of preventing a 
deep crisis from developing within the financial system. The forces of boom and bust 
unleashed among the Nordics were simply too strong to be neutralized by such financial 
supervision.
38  Thus, it is imperative to reform the supervisory system prior to or 
simultaneously with financial liberalization. Still, no financial supervision, however adequate 
and efficient, can prevent the emergence of a systemic financial crisis of the type that hit the 
Nordic countries in the early 1990s if the proper macroeconomic policies are not in place.  
 
5.4. Lesson 4: The benefits of a flexible and cautious approach 
 
The Nordic countries - with the exception of Denmark - applied a "big bang" approach to 
financial liberalization, thus creating a strong boom-bust cycle by “opening the floodgates”. 
Also, the Nordic economies were all market-based systems when they were financially 
                                                 
38 The same lesson holds for deposit insurance. Finland and Norway had such a system. Sweden acquired one as 
a result of the crisis. The crisis proved that deposit insurance was an insufficient arrangement. Instead, the 
government served as the ultimate guarantor of the stability of the banking system. 
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liberated. China starts from a different position, that of an economy in transition, which 
makes the process more complicated and therefore riskier.  
 
The lesson is that China should avoid a 'big bang' approach to financial liberalization as 
applied by the Nordics, and should instead adopt a cautious approach by liberalizing in small 
steps. This strategy will allow time to learn from mistakes and provide the opportunity to 
back-track if signs of major tensions develop, thereby minimizing the risk of financial turmoil. 
Also, the Nordics had no early warning system when they started on the road towards 




In addition to monitoring emerging risks, a cautious and flexible approach also includes the 
option to respond quickly and decisively if a financial crisis develops. In the case of the 
Nordics, the process of financial liberalization set off a chain of events that threatened to wipe 
out the entire equity of many banks. At that stage, far-reaching steps were taken in Finland to 
support the banking system; the savings bank group was taken over by the government. In 
Norway, the three biggest banks were nationalized, eliminating private ownership completely. 
The government of Sweden offered a blanket assurance for claims on Swedish commercial 
banks, nationalized the two insolvent banks, and set up asset management corporations to take 
over the bad assets of the remaining commercial banks.
40 
 
The Swedish approach is commonly praised for being swift and resolute.
41 It prevented bank 
runs; it maintained the solvent commercial banks in private ownership and allowed banks to 
continue financial intermediation, averting any credit crunch; it kept moral hazard for 
shareholders at bay, and it was transparent. Eventually, the bad assets taken over by the asset 
management corporations turned out to be something of a financial success once the economy 
had recovered; at least the losses turned out to be much smaller than initially expected.  
 
The policy lesson for China is clear in a case where deregulation contributes to a crisis. Rapid, 
transparent and determined government action to maintain public confidence in the strength 
                                                 
39 For example, the volume of credit and bank loans should be monitored closely. Any growth exceeding nominal 
GDP-growth should be considered as a warning signal. Asset price movements should also be followed closely. 
The actions of banks as well as non-bank financial intermediaries should be covered. 
40 See the account by Englund and Vihriälä (2009). 
41 The Swedish approach to resolution, covered in several studies, is summarized in Jonung (2009). 
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of the banking system reduces the impact of a financial crisis, dampens any credit crunch and 
allows for a rapid recovery of the financial system and thus of the real economy.  
 
There is an additional reason for China to be cautious. The Nordic countries are small 
economies with stable political traditions. They can experiment and have failures, without this 
leading to international consequences. China, in contrast, is an economic giant. If China 
makes serious policy mistakes when liberalizing its financial system, this may have a strong 
negative effect upon the rest of the world, in particular on other East Asian countries, not to 
mention far-reaching economic and political effects within China.  
 
While the pace of reform should be gradual, it should also be steady. The Nordic countries did 
not halt or reverse their liberalization process in response to the crisis. The lesson in this for 
China is that gradualism should be tempered by the importance of avoiding a stop-go policy. 
Once the momentum for a more competitive and open financial system is created, halting or 
doing a U-turn could entail higher costs than continuing onwards with appropriate 
modifications that reflect actual learning. 
 
5.5. Lesson 5: Financial liberalization can lead to costly crises, but it does not have to 
 
The loss in output and industrial production in the early 1990s is large compared to the 
outcome of previous major crises among the Nordics, as Table 2 shows. There is no event of a 
similar magnitude in the entire post-World War II period. It matches the depression of the 
1930s, commonly regarded as the most severe crisis of the 20
th century. Indeed, the financial 
crisis of the early 1990s is unique. It represents a sharp break with the business cycle pattern 
post-World War II, particularly in Finland and Sweden.  
 
From the fact that Finland, Norway and Sweden ended up in a deep crisis after financial 
liberalization, it is tempting to conclude that financial liberalization is bound to lead to crisis 
and can only be attained at a high cost to society. The Nordic experience demonstrates that 
such a conclusion is incorrect. The record of Denmark shows that financial liberalization can 
be implemented without creating a sharp boom-bust pattern.
42  
 
                                                 
42 Denmark is not the only country in Europe that designed its financial liberalization without creating a financial 
crisis. Austria and the Netherlands can be taken as further examples.  
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The policy lesson for China is that it is possible to carry out financial liberalization without 
causing a dramatic crisis across the whole economy. This requires, as stressed in the previous 
lessons above, that a general understanding of the processes unleashed by financial 
deregulation exists, that the authorities maintain a proper timing of the process of deregulation, 
that financial supervision is working, and that financial liberalization is conducted in a 
flexible and cautious manner.  
 
5.6. Lesson 6: Financial liberalization has long-run benefits  
 
The Nordic experience demonstrates that financial liberalization and the process of intensified 
financial integration that started once the barriers for cross-border financial flows were 
eliminated do have long-run beneficial effects on the conduct of stabilization policies and on 
the growth potential of the economy.  
 
For China, the long-run effects of financial liberalization are also most likely to be highly 
beneficial on its way to becoming the biggest economy in the world. A properly functioning 
financial system is a key determinant of growth and transformation. This would give China a 
greater degree of freedom in determining the strategy for its monetary policy too. With a 
market-oriented financial system, monetary policy can be focused to a larger extent than at 
present on domestic conditions. In future, the Chinese currency will be among the major 
reserve currencies. For this to happen, China must have a financial system that is open to the 
world.  
 
There are risks of postponing adjustment to an open financial system too. The costs of 
financial underdevelopment in the form of misallocation of credit, inferior stabilization 
policies and the build-up of financial imbalances, should also figure high on the agenda. The 
status quo is a costly state. This strengthens the case for speeding up the financial opening of 
China. 
 
The lesson here is simple. By opening up to international trade in recent decades, China has 
been surfing the global economy with success so far - but not to the full extent. The Nordic 
economies followed a similar strategy both before and after international financial integration. 
This suggests that financial opening is not a threat to the growth performance of China.  
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6. Conclusions  
 
This report has identified a set of policy lessons from the experience of the process of 
financial liberalization, of the ensuing financial crisis and recovery in Scandinavia during the 
period 1985-2000 that are deemed relevant for China today. These are as follows: (1) 
financial liberalization can be implemented without creating a deep financial crisis, (2) a 
thorough understanding by policy-makers and financial market participants of the behavioural 
and institutional linkages within the financial system and to the rest of the economy and the 
workings of open financial markets is central to making financial liberalization successful, (3) 
policy-makers should pay careful attention to initial conditions concerning regulation, taxes 
and exchange rate arrangements when moving towards financial openness, (4) the financial 
supervisory system should be reformed prior to or simultaneously with financial liberalization, 
(5) a "big bang" approach to financial liberalization as applied by the Nordics should be 
avoided, preferring instead a cautious approach by liberalizing in small, but substantive steps, 
and (6) the long-run effects of financial liberalization are most likely to be highly beneficial 
for China. A properly functioning financial system is a key determinant of growth and 
transformation. Maintaining the present status quo of financial underdevelopment brings high 
costs and the risk of abrupt – and thus very damaging - changes in the future.  
 
These policy lessons should be viewed as a package, because they are closely related. It is not 
sufficient to select a few and ignore the others. The approach to financial reform should be 
system-wide; otherwise there is a great risk that it will create problems along the road to 
financial openness.  
 
Financial reform and liberalization strike us as urgent issues, as China’s transition to a 
market-based economy is far from completed. Yet, given the complexity of the challenges 
ahead, arising from the intricate interdependencies with progress in other areas of reform and 
the need for maintaining stability, future financial reforms need to strike a careful balance 
between being gradual and substantive.  
 
Nevertheless, financial liberalization is still a risky venture. The short-run costs and risks 
must be compared with the long-run benefits. The costs or risks can be minimized if China is 
ready to learn the lessons from countries that have undergone financial liberalization - and the 
Nordics provide valuable lessons for China on this account.  
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Last, amid the present global financial crisis, there is growing doubt about the benefits of 
financial opening and financial liberalization. The Nordic experience does provide us with 
one clear-cut conclusion on this issue. None of the three Nordic countries that suffered the 
huge costs of financial crisis has taken steps to return to financial autarchy, to close its borders 
for capital flows, or otherwise to turn the clock back. This suggests that the benefits of 
financial integration outweigh its costs, even when those costs turn out to be very high for 
society in the short run.  
 
  41 
References 
  
Aizenman, J., and J. Lee, (2008), "Financial versus monetary mercantilism: Long-run view of 
large international reserves Hoarding", The World Economy, pp. 593-611. 
 
Allen, F., J. Qian, and M. Qian, (2005), “China’s financial system: Past, present and future,” 
mimeo, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
 
Allen, M., C. Rosenberg, C. Keller, B. Setser and N. Roubini, (2002), "A balance sheet approach 
to financial crisis", IMF working paper, WP/02/210, Washington DC. 
 
Andersen, T., B. Holmström, S. Honkapohja, S. Korkman, H, Söderström, J. Vartiainen, 
(2007), The Nordic model. Embracing globalization and sharing risks, ETLA, Helsinki. 
 
Aziz, J., (2006), “Rebalancing China’s economy: What does growth theory tell us?”, IMF 
working paper 06/291, Washington DC. 
 
Aziz, J., and L. Cui, (2007), “Explaining China’s low consumption: The neglected role of 
household income”, IMF working paper 07/181, Washington DC. 
 
Barnett, S., (2004), “Banking sector developments”, in: China’s growth and integration into 
the world economy, Prasad, E. (ed.), IMF occasional paper 232, Washington DC. 
 
Blanchard, O., F. Giavazzi and F. Sa, (2005), “International investors, the U.S. current 
account, and the dollar”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1, pp. 1-49. 
 
Bordo, M., B. Eichengreen, D. Klingebiel and M. Soledad Martinez-Peria, (2001), “Is the 
crisis problem growing more severe?”, Economic Policy, pp. 51-82. 
 
Bussière, M., and A. Mehl, (2008), "China's and India's roles in global trade and finance. 
Twin titans for the new millennium?", European Central Bank, occasional paper series 80, 
Frankfurt. 
 
Caballero, R., E. Farhi, and P. O. Gourinchas (2008), “An equilibrium model of global 
imbalances and low interest rates”, American Economic Review, vol. 98, pp. 358-93. 
 
Callesen, P., S. Lohmann Poulsen and R. Degn, (2008), "Har fastkurspolitikens option en 
positiv eller en negative vaerdi?", discussion paper for a conference of Nationaløkonomisk 
Forening, January, Department of Finance, Copenhagen.  
 
Calmfors, L., (2007), "Scandinavia today: An economic miracle?", chapter 4 in The EEAG 
Report on the European Economy 2007, CESifo Group, Munich. 
 
Cappiello, L., and F. Gianluigi, (2008), "The sustainability of China's exchange rate policy 
and capital account liberalisation", European Central Bank, occasional paper series 82, 
Frankfurt. 
 
Caprio, G., D. Klingebiel, L. Laeven and G. Noguera, (2005), "Banking crisis database", 
appendix to P. Honohan and L. Laeven, eds., Systemic financial crises. Containment and 
resolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
  42 
 
Cooper, R., (2008), “Global imbalances: Globalization, demography and sustainability”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 22 (3), pp. 93-112. 
 
Dollar, D. and S. Wei (2007), “Das (Wasted) Kapital: Firm ownership and investment 
efficiency in China”, IMF working paper 07/9, Washington DC. 
 
Dunaway, S., L., Leigh, and X. Li (2006), “How robust are estimates of equilibrium real 
exhange rates: The case of China”, IMF working paper 06/220, Washington DC. 
 
Drees, B. and C. Pazarbasioglu, (1998), “The Nordic banking crisis. Pitfalls in financial 
liberalization”, Occasional Paper 161, IMF, Washington DC. 
 
EFTA (1994). European economic integration. Effects of "1992" on the services sectors of the 
EFTA countries, Occasional Paper 49, December, Geneva. 
 
Englund, P. and V. Vihriälä, (2009), ”Financial crisis in Finland and Sweden: Similar but not 
quite the same”, chapter 3 in L. Jonung, J. Kiander and P. Vartia, eds., The great financial 
crisis of the 1990s in Finland and Sweden. The Nordic experience of financial liberalization, 
Edward Elgar. 
 
Ems, E., (1994a), "EEA and the financial services sectors in Sweden", Occasional Paper 9, 
Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm.  
 
Ems, E., ed., (1994b), "Financial integration in Western Europe. Structural and regulatory 
consequences", Occasional Paper 10, Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm.  
 
Farrell, D., S., Lund, J. Rosenfeld, F. Morin, N. Gupta and E. Greenberg, (2006), "Putting 
China's capital to work: The value of financial system", McKinsey Global Institute, 
McKinsey Company. 
 
Forbes, K., (2008), "Why do foreigners invest in the United States?”, Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco, working paper series 2008-27. 
 
Goodfriend, M. and E. Prasad, (2006), "A framework for independent monetary policy in 
China", IMF working paper 06/111, Washington DC. 
 
Guonan, M., and R. McCauley, (2007), "Do China's capital controls still bind? Implications 
for monetary autonomy and capital liberalisation", Bank for International Settlements, BIS 
working paper 233, Basel. 
 
Haltmaier, J., S. Ahmed, B. Coulibaly, R. Knippenberg, S. Leduc, M. Marazzi, and B. A. 
Wilson, (2007), "The role of China in Asia: Engine, conduit, or steamroller?", International 
Finance Discussion Papers 904, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Washington DC. 
 
Henrekson, M. and U. Jakobsson, (2005), "The Swedish model of corporate ownership and 
control in transition", chapter 7 in H. Huizinga and L. Jonung, eds., The internationalisation 
of asset ownership in Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.   
 
  43 
Henry, P. B., (2007), "Capital account liberalization: Theory, evidence, and speculation", 
Journal of Economic Literature, pp. 887-935.  
 
Hope, N., and F. Hu, (2007), “Reforming China’s banking system: How much can foreign 
strategic investment help?” in J. Aziz, S. Dunaway and E. Prasad, eds., China and India: 
Learning from each other: Reforms and policies for sustained growth, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington DC. 
 
IMF (1998), World Economic Outlook, May, IMF, Washington DC. 
 
James, H., (2001), The end of globalization. Lessons from the Great Depression, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge and London.  
 
Jonung, L., (2008), "Lessons from financial liberalisation in Scandinavia”, Comparative 
Economic Studies, vol. 50, pp. 564-598.  
 
Jonung, L., (2009), ""The Swedish model for resolving the banking crisis of 1991-93. Seven 
reasons why it was successful. European Economy, Economic papers 360, European 
Commission, February 2009, Brussels.  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary14130_en.htm 
 
Jonung, L., J. Kiander and P. Vartia, (2009), ”The great financial crisis in Finland and 
Sweden: The dynamics of boom, bust and recovery 1985-2000", chapter 5 in L. Jonung, J. 
Kiander and P. Vartia, eds., The great financial crisis of the 1990s in Finland and Sweden. 
The Nordic experience of financial liberalization, Edward Elgar. (A longer version published 




Ju, J. and S. J. Wei, (2007), "Domestic institutions and the bypass effect of financial 
globalization", NBER working paper 13148, Cambridge.  
 
Kose, M.A., E. Prasad, K. Rogoff and S. J., Wei, (2006), "Financial globalisation: A 
reappraisal", CEPR discussion paper 5842. 
 
Li, X. and S. Dunaway, (2005), “Estimating China’s “equilibrium” real exchange rate, IMF 
working paper 05/202, Washington DC. 
 
Lueth, E. and M. Syed (2006), "Rising inequality and polarization in Asia", Asia Pacific 
Regional Economic Outlook, World Economic and Financial Survey, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, DC. 
 
McKinnon, R. and G. Schnabl, (2008), "China's exchange rate impasse and the weak U.S. 
dollar", CESiFO working paper 2386. 
  
Ng, B. K., (2007), "Banking reform in China: An assessment in macroeconomic perspective", 
Economic Growth Centre, Singapore, working paper 2007/07. 
 
Podpiera, R., (2006), “Progress in China’s Banking Sector Reform: Has Bank Behaviour 
Changed?” IMF working paper 06/71, Washington DC. 
  44 
 
Prasad, E., T. Rumbaugh and Q. Wang, (2005), “Putting the Cart Before the Horse? Capital 
Account Liberalization and Exchange Rate Flexibility in China”, IMF Policy Discussion 
Paper 05/1, Washington DC. 
 
Roine, J., J. Vlachos and D. Waldenström, (2008), “The long-run determinants of inequality: 
What can we learn from top income data?”, IFN working paper 721, Stockholm. 
 
Schaumann, A., (1993), "Dansk økonomisk politik 1982-1992" (Danish economic policy 
1982-1992), report 20 in part 2 of Nya villkor för ekonomi och politik. 
Ekonomikommissionens förslag. SOU 1993:16, finansdepartementet, Stockholm. 
 
Schwierz, C., (2004), "Economic costs associated with the Nordic banking crises", chapter 4 
in Moe, T., J. Solheim and B. Vale., eds., The Norwegian banking crisis, Occasional Papers 
33, Bank of Norway, Oslo.  
 
Sherif, K., M. Borish and A. Gross (2003), “State-owned banks in the transition: Origins, 
evolutions and policy responses”, mimeo, World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Steigum, E., (2009), “ The boom and bust cycle in Norway",  chapter 7 in L. Jonung, J. 
Kiander and P. Vartia, eds., The great financial crisis of the 1990s in Finland and Sweden. 
The Nordic experience of financial liberalization, Edward Elgar. 
 
Tang, H., E. Zoli and I. Klytchnikova, (2000), “Banking crises in transition economies - 
Fiscal costs and related issues”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 284, 
Washington DC. 
 
Tornell, A. and F. Westermann, (2005), Boom-bust cycles and financial liberalization, MIT 
Press, Cambridge and London. 
 
Unteroberdoerster, O., (2004), “Banking reform in the lower Mekong countries”, IMF policy 
discussion paper 04/05, Washington DC. 
 
Vastrup, C., (2009), "How did Denmark avoid a banking crisis?”, chapter 8 in L. Jonung, J. 
Kiander and P. Vartia, eds., The Crisis of the 1990s in Finland and Sweden. The Nordic 
experience of financial liberalization, Edward Elgar. 
 
Wyplosz, C., (2001), "Financial restraints and liberalization in postwar Europe", chapter 5 in 
G. Caprio, P. Honohan and J. Stiglitz, eds., Financial liberalization. How far, how fast?, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Ylä-Antilla, P., J. Ali-Yrkkö and M. Nyberg, (2005), "Foreign ownership in Finland - 
boosting firm performance and changing corporate governance", chapter 8 in H. Huizinga and 
L. Jonung, eds., The internationalisation of asset ownership in Europe, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.  
 
  45 
 
Box 1. The procyclical effect of after-tax real rates 
 
The boom-bust episode 1985-93 in Finland, Norway and Sweden demonstrates the central role that 
rapid, large and unexpected changes in the real rate of interest, or more correctly in the after-tax real 
rate, may play in driving macroeconomic developments during the opening of financially closed 
economies with pegged but adjustable exchange rates.  
 
Prior to financial liberalization, the real rate in all three countries was negative, often in the range of 
minus 2-4 percent as a consequence of prevailing internal and external financial controls, the system 
of tax deductible interest payments on mortgage loans and high inflation and well entrenched inflation 
expectations. The negative real rates created extremely strong incentives for individuals and firms to 
accept more debt when controls were abolished and credit became freely available in the mid 1980s, 
thus driving the loan expansion. Banks and other financial intermediaries responded by increasing the 
supply of loans.  
 
Eventually, after major changes in the tax system, falling inflation and rising nominal interest rates, 
real after-tax rates turned positive, breaking the boom phase and reaching a peak during the end of the 
bust. At this stage, the real rate had reached uniquely high levels. The sharp - and to a large extent 
unexpected - rise in the real rate of interest created huge negative balance sheet or wealth effects, 
sharply reducing investments and consumption and raising private sector savings as the private sector 
tried to rebalance the composition of their portfolios. These contractionary balance sheet effects 
undermined the entire financial system, the wealth position of the private sector and the budget of the 
public sector. 
 
Other factors were at work too, influencing the boom-bust pattern. However, these factors were of 
secondary importance compared to the role of financial market developments. Without financial 
deregulation, the business cycle in Finland, Norway and Sweden during the period 1985-93 would 
have stayed less volatile and moved closer to the traditional cyclical pattern.  
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A. Key characteristics of financial system 
 
•  Banking system  Dominated by a few large 
commercial banks, and many small 
savings banks. The roots of the 
banking system stem from the 19
th 
century.  
Dominated by four state-owned banks 
(SOCBs) established with break-up of 
monobank system in 1984; commercial 
bank law since 1995; establishment of 
first non-state commercial bank in 1996 
 
•  Non-bank system  Stock market, bond market and 
insurance sector kept at bay by 
financial regulations, no major non-
bank financial intermediaries. (except 
finance companies) Foreign bank 
activities severely restricted or 
prohibited  
Emerging stock market, created in 1990 
with very limited free float and 
dominated by state-owned enterprises; 
nascent bond market, hampered by 
regulatory, legal and structural 
weaknesses. 
 
•  Supervision  Supervision based on formal control 
of bank lending and adherence to 
other regulation, without explicit risk 
supervision 
Significant progress in establishing 
framework for prudential supervision, 
including establishment of bank and 
securities regulators, CBRC (2003) and 
CSRC (1990); gradual phase-in of bank 
solvency framework towards BIS 
standards, as well as international best 
practice in accounting and classification 
standards. 
 
•  Competition  Competition restricted by the 
regulation of interest rates, fees and 
credit flows on each individual bank 
and entry into the financial sector. 
Restrictions on the establishment of 
new branches. Foreign banks not 
allowed to establish subsidiaries or 
branches in Sweden 
No competition legislation and 
institutions; competition from foreign 
banks gradually phased-in under WTO 
commitments; competition from smaller 
joint-stock banks hampered by 
thin/inefficient interbank market (in part 
reflecting the PBC’s frequent use of 
reserve requirements). 
 
B. Incentives for risk management 
•  Legal system   Strong legal system concerning 
bankruptcy procedures. ("rule of 
law") 
Weak enforcement of bankruptcy law 
(first adopted in 1998) and other creditor 
rights implies preference for borrowers 
with implicit or explicit state guarantees, 
such as state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
 
•  Governance  Strong central bank control of the 
flow of credit. Mostly private 
ownership of commercial and savings 
banks. 
Role of state as owner, supervisor, and 
customer of banks can create significant 
conflicts of interest, marring 
management accountability, 
performance-based salaries and 
promotions, and commercial decision-
making; foreign strategic investors 
beginning to play a role in governance 
and risk management. 
 
•  Capital  Capital raised through the private 
sectors. 
Repeated state-funded recapitalization of 
SOCBs (1998, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2004, 
2005) to compensate for legacy NPLs. 
 





•  Financial system controls 
•  Interest rate 
controls 
Interest rate controls, explicit or 
implicit, by the central bank. 
Some liberalization of interest rates, but 
floor on lending and cap on deposit 
rates. 
 
•  Rationing of 
credit 
Rationing of credits through the 
central bank and other public 
authorities. 
Directed lending gradually phased-out 
around 1998, but continued significant 
lending from SCBs to SOEs; lending 
quotas (“window guidance”) remain key 
monetary policy tool (see below); 
together with targets for NPL reduction 
this can provide incentive to rollover 




Pegged exchange rates to currency 
baskets.  
Pegged to US dollar until July 21, 2005; 
currently classified as crawling peg. 
 
•  Capital 
account 
controls 
Capital controls in effect since World 
War II after some liberalization in the 
1970s. 
Gradual relaxation with most 
transactions still subject to controls 
thereby shielding domestic banking 
system from international competition; 
total qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII) quota is US$30 billion 
(less than 1 percent of stock market 
capitalization); total qualified domestic 
institutional investor (QDII) quota is 
US$48.5 billion 
 
C. Macroeconomic environment 
•  Monetary policy framework 
•  Key 
objectives 
Full employment stabilization 
remains the main policy goal after the 
breakdown of the Brettons Woods 
system in the early 1970s. 
Defined as maintaining the stability of 
the value of the currency in order to 
promote economic growth. 
 
•  Status of 
central bank 
The central bank under the 
(unofficial) control of the government 
via the ministry of finance.  
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) must 
report to the State Council its decisions 
concerning the annual money supply, 
interest rates, exchange rates and other 
important issues specified by the State 
Council for approval. The PBC is also 
obliged to submit reports to the Standing 
Committee of the National People's 
Congress on the conduct of monetary 
policy and the performance of the 
financial industry. 
 
•  Key policy 
instruments 
Quantitative regulations of the flow 
of credit and the setting of interest 
rates, including steering credits to 
prioritized objectives such as 
financing of government budget and 
subsidizing housing. A gradual 
acceptance of more market-oriented 
techniques, financial deregulation in 
small steps starting in the 1970s. 
Devaluations of the exchange rate in 
the second half of the 1970s and early 
1980s. 
Emphasis is on use of reserve 
requirement ratio and central bank base 
interest rate, as well as quantitative 
lending quotas, but other instruments 
include, rediscounting, central bank 
lending, and increasingly open market 
operation. 
 





•  Recent performance and vulnerabilities 
•  Inflation 
track record 
High inflation in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s as part of an 
accommodative policy of devaluation 
to maintain full employment. 
Periods of double-digit inflation in part 
reflecting price liberalization; state 
procurement and non-market prices are 
now largely phased out, with average 
annual CPI inflation over past five years 
about 2½ percent. 
 
•  Fiscal 
position 
Large budget deficits accepted after 
OPEC I and II to maintain high 
domestic aggregate demand (to fight 
unemployment) in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.  
Strong real GDP growth has resulted in 
better-than-budgeted revenue per-
formance and smaller deficits in recent 
years, with a low official government 
debt level of 21 percent of GDP; 
contingent liabilities from a weak 
banking system and demographic 
changes may be large; sovereign credit 
rating is A- (S&P), A2 (Moody’s) and  
A- (Fitch). 
 
•  External 
position 
Improved current account position 
after OPEC I and II and repeated 
devaluations. 
Strong; current account surplus has 
averaged 7 percent of GDP over last five 
years, gross official reserves exceeded 
US$1.5 trillion (14 months of imports) at 
end 2007. 
 
Source: Authors' assessment, EFTA (1994), Ems (1994a, 1994b), Goodfriend and Prasad 
(2006), Hope and Hu (2007), People's Bank of China and IMF country reports. 
Comments: Table 1 covers Finland, Norway and Sweden in the mid 1980s. Denmark is 
excluded, as it was financially more open than its Nordic neighbours in the 1980s.  
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Table 2. The costs of major crises in Scandinavia 1877-2000 in terms of foregone growth in 
real income and in industrial production relative to trend (percentage points).  
Crisis of: 1877-78 1886 1900 1907 1920s 1930s 1990s
1. Loss of real income
Denmark 5,1 No crisis No crisis No loss No loss 6,5 No crisis
Period below trend 1877 - - - - 1932 -
Finland 24,2 No crisis 10,4 No crisis No crisis 24,3 26,4
 Period below trend  1877-81 - 1900-01 -- 1929-32 1990-93
Norway No crisis 0,7 1,4 No crisis 21,5* 13,3 12,4
 Period below trend  - 1885-86 1900 - 1921 1931 1988-93
Sweden 11,3 No crisis No crisis 11,2 9,6* 17,7 13,0
 Period below trend  1877-78 - - 1908-09 1921 1931-33 1990-93
2. Loss of industrial production
Denmark 10,6 No crisis No crisis No loss No crisis 18,4 No crisis
Period below trend 1877-78 ---- 1931-32 -
Finland 72,2 No crisis 21,0 No crisis No crisis 46,4 21,4
 Period below trend  1876-79 - 1901-02 - - 1930-33 1990-92
Norway No crisis no data no data No crisis 36,9* 26,3** 2,7
P e r i o d  b e l o w  t r e n d ---- 1921 1931 1988
Sweden 14,7 No crisis No crisis 17,3 19,8* 30,9 17,0
 Period below trend  1877-78 - - 1908-09 1921 1930-33 1990-93
 
Comments: * two-year trend used, ** four-year trend used.  
Source: Jonung (2008). 
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Table 3. Key demographic and economic characteristics of China and the Nordics in 2007 
 
 China  Denmark Finland Norway  Sweden The 
Nordics
Population (in million)  1,328.8 5.5 5.3 4.7 9.1 19.1
Population (in percent of world 
population) 
1)  15.46 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.22
GDP (in billion US dollars) 
2)  3,424.38 310.26 246.16 389.01 453.19 1398.62
GDP per capita (in thousand US 
dollars) 
2)  2.58 56.82 46.55 49.54 82.66 58.89
Percent share in world GDP 
2)  10.83 0.30 0.28 0.38 0.51 2.57
In percent of GDP   
     Consumption   49 75 72 61 73 70
     Investment   40 22 20 21 19 21
     Savings  65 24 29 39 28 30
GDP growth rate (in percent)  11.90 1.70 4.50 3.70 2.70 3.07
Foreign reserves (in billion US 
dollars)  1,337.0 32.9 6.2 57.4 25.5 122.0
Foreign reserves per capita (in 
thousands of US dollars)  1.01 6.02 1.17 12.20 2.79 6.37
Foreign reserves in months of 
imports  8.59 0.33 0.03 0.50 0.02 0.21
1) Own estimate from UNSTAT.  
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Note: The discontinuity of the series for Scandinavia in 1999-2000 is due to a change in the compilation method 
for Denmark.  
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Note: Scandinavia = 100 in PPP terms. 
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Figure 12. Foreign liabilities of the banking system to GDP in Scandinavia and China, 1980-









1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
Scandinavia
China
Source: IMF IFS, IMF WEO.
 
 
  57 
  58










1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
China
Scandinavia
















1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
China
Scandinavia
Source: IMF IFS, IMF WEO.
 
 